Between mid-July and mid-August 2026, three widely deployed families of remote-access and firewall appliances were confirmed under active attack: SonicWall’s SMA 1000 series, Palo Alto Networks’ GlobalProtect VPN, and Cisco’s Secure Firewall ASA and FTD software. The details differ: zero-days exploited for weeks before disclosure, a flaw patched in May that ransomware affiliates were still exploiting in June, and a bug that lets an outsider force a firewall to reboot. What they share is position: each device sits at the network edge, reachable from the internet and trusted by everything behind it.
The lesson is uncomfortable for patch programs that measure success by time to patch alone. In two of the three cases, attackers were inside before defenders had a patch to apply, or before they applied it, and closing the hole would not by itself have removed them. This article reviews what happened and what organizations, including smaller businesses with lean IT teams, should do now.
What happened
SonicWall SMA 1000: three weeks of exploitation before disclosure
On 14 July, SonicWall published a product notice for two vulnerabilities in its SMA 1000 remote-access appliances (SMA 6210, 7210, 8200v and the CMS): CVE-2026-15409, a server-side request forgery flaw rated CVSS 10.0, and CVE-2026-15410, rated 7.2. SonicWall said both had been “confirmed as being actively exploited in the wild” and released hotfixes 12.4.3-03453 and 12.5.0-02835. CISA added both to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog the same day and gave US federal agencies until 17 July to act.
The attacks predated the advisory. Rapid7’s managed detection team observed targeted exploitation before disclosure, and researchers have traced activity back to at least 22 June. According to Rapid7, as reported by Help Net Security, the attackers collected high-value credentials, active session databases and TOTP multi-factor seed configurations, then authenticated to domain controllers directly from the appliance’s internal address. Volexity tracks one actor behind the activity as UTA0533. In early August, SecurityWeek reported Resecurity’s finding that INC Ransomware was behind most of the recent exploitation. The group has listed new victims from several countries on its leak site, claims that have not been independently verified.
Palo Alto GlobalProtect: patched in May, exploited in June
CVE-2026-0257 is an authentication bypass in the GlobalProtect portal and gateway of PAN-OS. It is exploitable when authentication override cookies are enabled with specific certificate configurations, and it lets an unauthenticated attacker establish a VPN session. Palo Alto Networks released fixes on 13 May. BleepingComputer reports that Rapid7 saw exploitation from 17 May, and CISA added the flaw to KEV on 29 May.
On 20 July, Arctic Wolf Labs described several separate June intrusions that began with this flaw and ended with Qilin ransomware. Once on the VPN, the attackers stole credentials from LSASS memory and the Active Directory database, moved laterally over administrative shares, in some cases disabled Defender real-time protection, wiped event logs, stole data in the double-extortion cases and targeted Veeam backups. Arctic Wolf noted they moved quickly to ensure “they would not lose their foothold if the VPN session was terminated or the vulnerability patched.” CISA marked the flaw as used in ransomware campaigns around 20 July. Shadowserver counts more than 167,000 GlobalProtect instances online; how many remain unpatched is unknown.
Cisco ASA and FTD: a remote reboot switch
On 11 August, Cisco disclosed CVE-2026-20349 (CVSS 8.6) in the Remote Access SSL VPN service of Secure Firewall ASA and FTD software. A crafted HTTP request from an unauthenticated attacker can force the device to reload. Cisco stated that “in August 2026, the Cisco PSIRT became aware of active exploitation” and that “there are no workarounds that address this vulnerability.” Devices with SSL VPN, IKEv2 remote access with client services, or (on FTD) Zero Trust Network Access enabled are exposed. CISA added it to KEV the same day, with a 14 August deadline.
Cisco has not described code execution or data theft. It still extends a pattern: this is the third consecutive year that an exploited ASA/FTD flaw has entered KEV, after the ArcaneDoor espionage campaign in 2024 and the September 2025 pair (CVE-2025-20333 and CVE-2025-20362) that prompted CISA Emergency Directive 25-03.
Timeline
- 13 May: Palo Alto Networks releases fixes for CVE-2026-0257.
- 17 May: Rapid7 begins observing exploitation.
- 29 May: CISA adds CVE-2026-0257 to KEV.
- June: Intrusions later analyzed by Arctic Wolf begin with the GlobalProtect flaw and end in Qilin ransomware.
- 22 June: Earliest known exploitation of SonicWall SMA 1000.
- 14 July: SonicWall discloses and patches the SMA 1000 flaws; CISA adds both to KEV.
- 20 July: Arctic Wolf publishes its Qilin analysis.
- 3 August: Resecurity’s INC Ransomware link is reported.
- 11 August: Cisco discloses CVE-2026-20349; CISA adds it to KEV.
Why it matters
Edge devices hold the keys. A VPN gateway sees every remote user’s credentials, issues session tokens, may store MFA seeds and connects to the directory with a service account. Compromising it gives an attacker a trusted network position and the means to impersonate users. These appliances typically cannot run endpoint detection agents, and their logs often stay on the device.
A patch closes the door; it does not search the house. SonicWall’s notice says affected customers must patch and perform forensic analysis and, if indicators of compromise are found, re-image the appliance, change user and administrator passwords and reset TOTP tokens. The last step is easily skipped, yet a stolen TOTP seed keeps generating valid codes after a password change. In the GlobalProtect intrusions, attackers quickly set up persistence beyond the VPN session; Arctic Wolf advises terminating all active sessions after patching.
The safe window is shrinking, or negative. GlobalProtect exploitation began four days after the fix. SMA 1000 exploitation began three weeks before one existed. On a typical 30-day patch cycle, an organization is often assessing a possible compromise rather than preventing one.
Availability is a security issue too. When a firewall that also terminates the VPN reloads, remote staff and branch links go offline with it. Unexplained edge-device reboots deserve a security review, not just an operations ticket.
In Vietnam, as elsewhere, many VPN gateways and firewalls are run by small internal teams or outsourced providers whose remit is patching, not checking for intrusion. That is exactly the gap these cases expose.
What to do now
- Inventory and verify versions. List every internet-facing VPN, firewall and remote-access appliance, the version actually running and the services exposed. Check against vendor advisories (SMA 1000 hotfix 12.4.3-03453 or 12.5.0-02835 and later; PAN-OS fixed releases; Cisco’s Software Checker), on the device rather than from a closed ticket.
- Patch the KEV-listed flaws now, or reduce exposure. For GlobalProtect, the interim options are disabling authentication override cookies or using a dedicated certificate for them. Cisco offers no workaround, so restrict VPN reachability to known source ranges where the business allows.
- Treat the exposure window as a possible compromise. If an SMA 1000 was internet-facing from late June until patched, or GlobalProtect with authentication override ran unpatched after mid-May, run a compromise assessment: compare appliance logs with published indicators, and look for directory logins from the appliance’s own internal address and VPN sessions from hosting-provider ranges or unfamiliar device names.
- Evict, not just patch. Terminate all active VPN sessions after upgrading. If indicators are found, re-image or redeploy the appliance, reset user and administrator passwords, re-enroll MFA for users served by the device, rotate service-account credentials and, where domain compromise is suspected, reset the KRBTGT account twice.
- Take management interfaces off the internet and disable unused features.
- Get edge logs off the box. Forward appliance and domain controller logs to a SIEM and alert on log clearing, unexpected reloads, configuration changes and new administrator accounts.
- Protect what ransomware targets next. Keep at least one offline or immutable backup and test restores. Block unsanctioned remote-access and file-transfer tools such as AnyDesk, Ngrok and Rclone.
- Write it into the process. Set a target, for example 72 hours, for KEV-listed edge flaws, subscribe to vendor and KEV notifications, and include compromise assessment in outsourced IT contracts.
Era Artech’s perspective
Edge appliances are bought to reduce risk, yet in recent weeks they have been the most direct route into several networks. In our view, the practical answer lies less in switching vendors than in redefining “done” after an advisory: patched, sessions reset, logs reviewed, credentials rotated where needed. Organizations that make those steps routine will be better placed for the next edge-device advisory, which on current form is unlikely to be far off.