Data breach

McKesson breach: the vishing-to-SaaS playbook behind ShinyHunters' claim, and the identity controls that stop it

McKesson confirmed data theft via third-party apps after ShinyHunters claimed a vishing and Okta SSO intrusion. What is confirmed, what is claimed, what to fix.

All articles

On 28 August 2026, McKesson, the US pharmaceutical distribution and healthcare technology company, told the Securities and Exchange Commission that it had discovered a cybersecurity incident three days earlier. The same day it told customers that the incident involved “third-party applications and unauthorized access and exfiltration of data.” The extortion group ShinyHunters has claimed responsibility, saying it phoned employees, took over their Okta single sign-on (SSO) accounts and pulled data out of McKesson’s Salesforce and Snowflake environments.

For most businesses the route matters more than the claimed haul, which McKesson has not confirmed. Neither the company nor the group has described a software flaw in Okta, Salesforce or Snowflake. The claimed path runs through people, an identity provider and the SaaS platforms connected to it, the pattern Health-ISAC has been warning the health sector about in recent weeks. Companies in Vietnam that run the same platforms face the same path.

What happened

What McKesson has confirmed

In its Form 8-K, McKesson said the investigation “is in its early stages” and that it “has not determined that the incident is material”, filing under Item 7.01 rather than Item 1.05, the item for incidents judged material.

On 28 August its customer information center warned of possible intermittent service degradation. On 29 August, chief information and technology officer Francisco Fraga wrote that the unauthorized access to “certain third-party applications” and the exfiltration were associated with a subset of customers in the Oncology & Multispecialty and Medical-Surgical business units. McKesson cited “reasonable assurance of no ongoing unauthorized activity”, said distribution centers were still shipping, and said it expects to offer complimentary credit monitoring and identity protection.

As of this writing, McKesson has not said which applications were involved, how the attackers got in, what data was taken or how many people are affected.

What ShinyHunters claims

According to BleepingComputer, which has not verified the claims, the group says:

  • it vished several employees and compromised their Okta SSO accounts;
  • it used those accounts to reach Salesforce, including support cases, and Snowflake;
  • it exfiltrated about 1 TB between 21 and 25 August;
  • the Snowflake data holds about 284 million patient-related records, which the group itself clarified is a raw count of rows, not unique individuals;
  • it then demanded USD 55,236,150 with a 72-hour deadline, and McKesson did not respond.

A separate source told BleepingComputer that a .claims lookalike domain was used.

Timeline

  • 21-25 August: data exfiltration window, according to ShinyHunters.
  • 22 August: a similar vishing attempt targets ReliaQuest (see below).
  • 25 August: McKesson discovers the incident; the group says it sent its ransom demand after the theft ended.
  • 28 August: CyberInsider, then BleepingComputer, report the claim. McKesson notifies customers and files its 8-K. Health-ISAC issues an urgent TLP:WHITE alert on ShinyHunters vishing.
  • 29 August: McKesson ties the exfiltration to a subset of customers in two business units.
  • 3 September: Health-ISAC publishes the alert on its public website.

How the attack chain works

According to Health-ISAC’s urgent alert, callers spoof known numbers, reach staff on personal mobiles and follow up with pressuring voicemails, steering them to a fake login page on domains patterned like company-claims[.]com or company[.]claims. The page is a reverse proxy: it relays the password to the real portal in real time while the caller asks for the MFA code or a push approval. The attacker ends up holding a valid session. In Health-ISAC’s words, “the SSO platform is the control plane”: from the identity dashboard, every connected application is one click away.

Three lessons follow:

  1. MFA a person can read out or approve can be relayed. Codes, push prompts and SMS fail against a live caller with a proxy page. FIDO2/WebAuthn keys and passkeys are bound to the real domain, so a lookalike page cannot reuse them.
  2. The help desk is part of authentication. Password resets, MFA resets and device enrolment by phone lead to the same session.
  3. Data-rich SaaS deserves production-database controls. CRM cases and warehouse tables can hold the same personal data as core systems but are monitored less, and bulk export through legitimate APIs looks like normal work.

A near miss from the same week shows what works. ReliaQuest reports that on 22 August a caller posing as a named security employee got one staff member to enter a password on a fake SSO page and approve the push prompt. The attacker obtained a view-only session on the identity dashboard, but every attempt to open an application was denied because device trust blocks unmanaged devices. “We don’t treat a sign-in to our identity provider as permission to do anything at all,” the company wrote. The MFA prompt did not stop the login; what limited the damage was what an authenticated identity could reach from an unmanaged device.

Why it matters

Extortion without encryption. McKesson kept shipping, and no file encryption has been reported. The leverage is the stolen data, which continuity plans built around locked systems do not cover.

A vendor’s breach becomes its customers’ problem. McKesson links the data to a subset of its customers, who now face questions from patients and partners before the scope is known.

Claimed numbers cut both ways. The 284 million figure counts rows, not people, and extortion groups have reasons to inflate. But “not material” in an early 8-K says nothing about how sensitive the data is. Plan around data types, not headline counts.

What it means for Vietnamese businesses

Vietnamese companies run the same stack of SSO, CRM and cloud data platforms. Outsourcing and BPO firms often work inside foreign clients’ SaaS tenants, where one compromised identity exposes the client’s data.

Vietnam’s Personal Data Protection Law (No. 91/2025/QH15, in force since 1 January 2026) sets a short clock. Under Article 23, a controller, a controller-processor or a third party that discovers a violation which may harm national defense, security or public order, or the life, health, honor, dignity or property of data subjects, must notify the specialized personal data protection agency under the Ministry of Public Security within 72 hours of discovery; a processor must notify the controller promptly. Decree 356/2025/NĐ-CP (Article 28, Form 08) lists the required content: the nature of the violation including time, place, conduct, data types and volume, a contact point, likely consequences and mitigation. McKesson disclosed three days after discovery, with its investigation “in its early stages”; meeting a 72-hour deadline depends on knowing in advance what each SaaS tenant holds.

What to do now

  1. Put high-risk accounts on phishing-resistant MFA. Start with administrators, help-desk staff, executives and anyone with bulk-export rights; use FIDO2 keys or passkeys and remove SMS and voice fallbacks.
  2. Close the help-desk route. Never complete MFA or password resets on an inbound call. Require a callback to the number on file plus manager approval for privileged users, and alert on every new MFA factor or device enrolment.
  3. Require managed devices for SaaS. Use conditional access or device trust so a valid session from an unmanaged machine cannot open CRM, data warehouse or mail. This is what contained the ReliaQuest attempt.
  4. Govern connected apps and API access. Inventory OAuth grants and integrations, require admin approval for new ones, remove those left by former vendors, and limit API and bulk-export rights to named accounts with network restrictions.
  5. Watch for bulk data movement. Centralize identity and SaaS audit logs (sign-ins, report exports, API volume, query history) and alert on unusual export size, new client applications and logins from new devices.
  6. Shrink the lookalike-domain window. Block the .claim and .claims top-level domains if you do not use them, as Health-ISAC recommends; monitor new domains resembling your brand; tell staff plainly that IT will never ask for an MFA code.
  7. Rehearse SaaS containment and the 72-hour notice. Practice revoking sessions and tokens and disabling a suspicious integration. Keep a Form 08 draft with data inventories and contacts filled in, and require prompt incident reporting in processor contracts.

Era Artech’s perspective

The McKesson investigation is young, and the attacker’s figures deserve caution until the company completes its review. The lesson does not depend on them: once a phone call can become an authenticated SSO session, what matters is what that session can reach. Device trust, phishing-resistant MFA for a short list of high-risk users and SaaS audit logging are unglamorous work, but in a similar attempt the same month they separated a breach from a near miss.

Sources

  1. McKesson Corporation, Form 8-K Current Report (date of report: August 25, 2026) U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (EDGAR) ·
  2. Customer Cybersecurity Information Center McKesson Corporation ·
  3. McKesson discloses breach after ShinyHunters claims patient data theft BleepingComputer ·
  4. Urgent Threat Alert: ShinyHunters Vishing Campaigns and Domain Impersonation Health-ISAC ·
  5. A Social Engineering Attempt Against ReliaQuest: What We Found ReliaQuest ·
  6. Luật số 91/2025/QH15 của Quốc hội: Luật Bảo vệ dữ liệu cá nhân Cổng Thông tin điện tử Chính phủ (Government of Viet Nam portal) ·

This analysis reflects information that was publicly available on its publication date. It is provided for general information only and is not legal or professional advice.

Need help assessing your exposure?

Our team can review your systems against the issues discussed here and help you prioritize fixes.

Talk to our security team